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CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT RATIONALES: 
EVIDENCE FROM CROATIAN COMPANIES
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Modigliani-Mill-
er theorem, corporate risk management is irrelevant to the value of the fi rm. 
However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging 
activities that are directed at the reduction of corporate risks. As an explana-
tion for this clash between theory and practice, imperfections in the capital 
market are used to argue for the relevance of corporate risk management 
function. This paper analyses corporate risk management practices and de-
cision to hedge in large Croatian non-fi nancial companies. By using univari-
ate and multivariate analysis, it explores if decision to hedge corporate risks 
in the analysed companies is a function of several fi rm’s characteristics that 
have been proven as relevant in making risk management decisions. 
Key words: corporate risk management decision, hedging theories, 
shareholder value maximisation, managers’ private utility maximisation, 
large Croatian non-fi nancial companies 
1. Introduction
For a long time it was believed that corporate risk management1 is irrel-
evant to the value of the fi rm and the arguments in favour of the irrelevance were 
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based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAMP) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; 
Mossin, 1966) and the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem (Modigliani and Mill-
er, 1958). One of the most important implications of CAPM is that diversifi ed 
shareholders should care only about the systematic component of total risk. This 
implies that managers of fi rms who are acting in the best interests of sharehold-
ers should be indifferent about hedging of risks that are unsystematic. Miller and 
Modigliani’s proposition supports CAPM fi ndings. The conditions underlying 
MM propositions also imply that decisions to hedge corporate exposures to inter-
est rates, exchange rates and commodity prices are completely irrelevant because 
stockholders already protect themselves against such risks by holding well-diver-
sifi ed portfolios. 
Despite the fact that, in the basic MM world, hedging does not alter fi rm 
value, markets where derivatives are traded are dominated by corporations and in-
stitutions, not by individuals trading for their personal accounts. In the real world, 
fi nancial managers and treasurers give a great deal of thought to matters of capital 
structure and securities design. Additionally, the corporate use of derivatives in 
hedging different kinds of corporate risks (e.g. interest rate, currency or com-
modity price risks) is widespread and growing. As an explanation for this clash 
between theory and practice, imperfections in the capital market are used to argue 
for the relevance of corporate risk management function. Research in the 1980s 
and 1990s has extended the knowledge on risk management by examining the 
unique character istics of large, widely held corporations. Based on work by May-
ers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate demand for insurance, scholars 
such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Shapiro and Titman (1998) have 
examined why large, well-diversifi ed fi rms actively engage in hedging activities. 
The authors demonstrated several theories of hedging which overcome the ir-
relevancy arguments of modern portfolio and corporate fi nance theory. Most of 
these theories rely on the introduction of frictions into the MM model, and argue 
that market imperfections enable fi rms to add value through hedges that can not 
be exactly duplicated by individual investors. 
2. Literature review 
Scholars have constructed two classes of explanations or determinants for 
management concern with hedging of non-systematic risk, which overcome the 
irrelevancy arguments of modern portfolio and corporate fi nance theory. The fi rst 
class of explanations focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise share-
holder value, and the second focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise 
managers’ private utility. 
Positive theories of risk management, as a lever for shareholder value crea-
tion, argue that fi rm value is a concave objective function because of capital mar-
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ket imperfections. The fi rst theory suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash 
fl ows, fi rms can decrease costs of fi nancial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; 
Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998). In 
the MM world, fi nancial distress is assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the 
probability of fi nancial distress does not affect fi rm value. If fi nancial distress is 
costly, fi rms have incentives to reduce its probability, and hedging is one method 
by which a fi rm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing the variance 
of a fi rm’s cash fl ows or accounting profi ts, hedging decreases the probability, 
and thus the expected costs, of fi nancial distress. Additionally, Smith and Stulz 
(1985) have argued that, while the reduction of fi nancial distress costs increases 
fi rm value, it augments shareholder value even further by simultaneously raising 
the fi rm’s potential to carry debt. Corporate risk management lowers the cost of 
fi nancial distress, which leads to a higher optimal debt ratio and the tax shields of 
the additional debt capital further increases the value of the fi rm. This theory has 
been empirically proven by, among others, Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; Bessem-
binder 1991; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996 and Haushalter 2000. 
The second hedging rationale suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash 
fl ows, fi rms can decrease agency costs (see: Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accord-
ing to Dobson and Soenen (1993) there are three sound reasons based on agency 
costs why management should hedge corporate risk. First, hedging reduces uncer-
tainty by smoothing the cash fl ow stream thereby lowering the fi rm’s cost of debt. 
Since the agency cost is borne by management, assuming informational asymme-
try between management and bond holders, hedging will increase the value of the 
fi rm. Therefore, manage ment will rationally choose to hedge. Second, given the 
existence of debt fi nancing, cash fl ow smoothing through exchange risk hedging 
will tend to reduce the risk-shift ing as well as the underinvestment problems (see 
Jensen and Smith, 1985). Finally, hedging reduces the probability of fi nancial dis-
tress and thereby increases duration of contractual relations between shareholders. 
By foster ing corporate reputation acquisition, hedging contributes directly to the 
amelioration of the moral-hazard agency problem. Results of MacMinn (1987), 
MacMinn and Han (1990), Bessembinder (1991), Minton and Schrand (1999) and 
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) support this hedging rationale. 
Another theory that focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise 
shareholder value argue that, by reducing the volatility of cash fl ows, fi rms can 
decrease expected taxes. This rationale is put forward by Smith and Stulz (1985) 
who have argued that the structure of the tax code can make it benefi cial for the 
fi rms to take positions in futures, forward, or option markets. If a fi rm faces a 
convex tax function, then the after-tax value of the fi rm is a concave function of 
its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax fi rm values, then 
the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the fi rm 
is increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the ef-
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fective long run average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported 
earnings will enhance shareholder value. More convex the effective tax schedule 
is, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. This rationale has been supported 
by Zimmerman (1988), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993), Mian (1996) and Graham and Smith (1996). 
In addition, reducing cash fl ow volatility can improve the probability of hav-
ing suffi cient internal funds for planned investments eliminating the need either to 
cut profi table projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external funding. 
The main hypothesis is that, if access to external fi nancing (debt and/or equity) 
is costly, fi rms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash 
fl ows to avoid a shortfall in their funds, which could precipitate a costly visit 
to the capital markets. An interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is 
that fi rms which have substantial growth opportunities and face high costs when 
raising funds under fi nancial distress will have an incentive to hedge more of 
their exposure than the average fi rm. This rationale has been explored by nu-
merous scholars, among others by Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), Les-
sard (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1998), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Gay and 
Nam (1998), Graham and Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand (1999), Haushalter 
(2000), Mello and Parsons (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, 
Randall and Lie (2002).
Other line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders value maximisa-
tion hypothesis refers to the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. It has 
been argued that fi rm managers have limited ability to diversify their own person-
al wealth position, associated with stock holdings and the capitalisation of their 
career earnings associated with their own employment position. Therefore, they 
will have an incentive to hedge their own wealth on the expense of the sharehold-
ers. Usually that kind of hedging is not conducted to improve value of company’s 
stockholders but to improve managers own wealth. To avoid this problem, mana-
gerial compensation contract must be designed so that when managers increase 
the value of the fi rm, they also increase their expected utility. This can usually be 
obtained by adding option-like provisions to managerial contracts. This rationale 
was fi rstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been further explored by Smith and 
Stulz (1985). Results of some empirical studies have confi rmed this hypothesis 
(e.g. see: Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998) while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings.
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric infor-
mation, has been presented by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo 
and Duffi e (1992), who have focused on managers’ reputations. In both of these 
models, it is argued that managers may prefer to engage in risk management activ-
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ities in order to better communicate their skills to the labour market. Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffi e (1992) have argued that younger 
executives and those with shorter tenures have less developed reputations than 
older as well as longer-tenure managers. Therefore, they are more willing to em-
brace new concepts like risk management with the intention to signal their man-
agement quality. Tufano (1996) has tested these assumptions and found that there 
is no meaningful relationship between CEO and CFO age and the extent of risk 
management activity. However, he has proven that fi rms whose CFOs have fewer 
years in their current job are more likely to engage in greater risk management 
activities, confi rming the hypothesis that newer executives are more willing to en-
gage in risk management activities than are their counterparts with long-tenures. 
Thus, the results can be seen as consistent with Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) 
and DeMarzo and Duffi e (1992) theory.
Results of empirical studies have also proven that benefi ts of risk manage-
ment program depend to the size of the company. Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Dolde (1995), Mian (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Hush-
alter (2000) have argued that larger fi rms are more likely to hedge. One of the 
key factors in the corporate risk management rationale pertains to the costs of 
engaging in risk-management activities. The cost of hedging includes the direct 
transaction costs as well as the agency costs of ensuring that managers transact 
appropriately. Transaction costs of hedging include the costs of trading, as well as 
the substantial costs of information systems needed to provide the data necessary 
to decide on the appropriate hedging positions to take. The agency costs that such 
activities bring include the costs of the internal control systems to run the hedging 
program. These costs are associated with the opportunities for speculation that 
participation in derivative markets allows. The assumption underlying this ratio-
nale is that there are substantial economies of scale or economically signifi cant 
costs related to hedging. Indeed, for many fi rms (particularly smaller fi rms), the 
marginal benefi ts of a hedging program may be exceeded by the marginal costs. 
These facts suggest there may be sizable set-up costs related to operating a corpo-
rate risk-management pro gram. Thus, numerous fi rms may not hedge at all, even 
though they are exposed to fi nancial risks, simply because it is not an economi-
cally worthwhile activity. On the basis of the empirical results, it can be argued 
that only large fi rms with suffi ciently large risk exposures are likely to benefi t 
from a formal hedging program. 
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3. Corporate Risk Management in Croatian Companies
3.1. Methodology and Data Collection
Empirical research was conducted on the largest Croatian non-fi nancial com-
panies because these companies should have a developed risk management pro-
gramme. Companies needed to meet two out of three conditions required by the 
Croatian Accounting Law2 that relate to large companies to be selected in the sam-
ple - 1) a value of total assets higher than 108 million kuna, (2) income in the last 
12 months higher than 216 million kuna, and/or (3) annual number of employees 
higher than 250. A list of the largest 400 Croatian companies in the year 20053 has 
been used and 157 companies that have met the required criteria were selected 
in the sample. The primary advantage of this sample is that the evidence can be 
generalised to a broad class of fi rms in different industries. Financial fi rms were 
excluded from the sample because most of them are also market makers, hence 
their motivation in using risk management instruments (e.g. derivatives) may be 
different from the motivations of non-fi nancial fi rms. 
The greatest challenge of this research was to fi nd an appropriate data set, 
because the analysed companies have not been very public about their risk man-
agement activities. Data were collected from two sources: from annual reports and 
notes to the fi nancial statements for the fi scal year 2005, and through the survey. 
We relied more on the survey data than on the annual reports due to the fact that 
not all of the analysed Croatian companies were obliged to report risk manage-
ment activities in notes to the fi nancial statements. This obligation refers only to 
those companies that are listed on the stock-exchange, while many companies in 
our sample are not public joint-stock companies. 
The questionnaire was mailed at the beginning of September 2006 to the 
fi rm’s chief fi nancial offi cer or, if there was no such position, to the fi nancial 
controller or the treasurer. The implicit assumption was that these are the persons 
most likely to have the relevant information. The question naires were addressed 
to a specifi c individual. It should be emphasised that the problem with a survey 
is that the person who fi lls in the questionnaire out does not necessarily have the 
relevant information or the motivation to provide careful and truthful answers. 
Moreover, questions are not always interpreted correctly. We tried to gauge ac-
curacy in different ways. First, we wanted to make sure that the people who com-
pleted the questionnaire had the information we were interested in. This is why 
the questionnaire was sent to the chief fi nancial offi cer or to the controller and 
2 In Croatian: Zakon o računovodstvu, Narodne novine 146/05.
3 The list has been published by the special edition of Privredni vjesnik (Business Herald).
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the treasurer of the fi rm. Then we asked fi rms to tell us who actually fi lled out 
the questionnaire. In the vast majority of the cases (more than 90 per cent), the 
answering person was indeed, at least apparently, the CFO, the treasurer or the 
controller. Unless people who complete the questionnaire are dishonest or care-
less, we should therefore have received accurate information.
In order to encourage willingness to participate, the respondents were prom-
ised a copy of the sum marised results. Only 19 companies answered by the end 
of September, so a follow-up letter was sent to the non-respondents. Sending a 
follow-up letter encouraged a response rate from 12 to 31 per cent. An adequate 
response rate is the problem that has been often raised in research based on a sur-
vey. We believe that the accomplished response rate is satisfactory for statistical 
generalisation (e.g. the response rate of the 1998 Wharton survey of derivate us-
age, as reported in Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) is 21 per cent). However, it 
is important to mention that the inability to compare the survey results to the data 
of non-responding companies should be treated as a limitation of this research.
Survey data were statistically analysed by using both univariate and mul-
tivariate analysis. We have used the independent sample t-test to calculate the 
differences between means for Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers. Independent 
sample t-test enables a calculation of statistically signifi cant differences between 
small and mutually unrelated parametric samples (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
Croatian research sample was small, unrelated and parametric. In addition, re-
search data were of a non-categorical nature (interval/ratio data), therefore t-test 
was found as the most suitable for univariate analysis. Additionally, correlation 
analysis was conducted by calculating Pearson’s correlation coeffi cient as it is the 
most common measure of linear correlation when variables are of interval/ratio 
nature.
Regarding the multivariate analysis, binominal logistic regression was esti-
mated to distinguish between the possible explanations for the decision to hedge 
corporate risks. Binomial (or binary) logistic regression has been selected because 
it is a form of regression that is used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy 
(limited, discrete and not continuous) and the independents are of any type4 (Hos-
mer and Lemeshow, 1989; Rice, 1994; Allison, 1999; Menard, 2002). In our re-
search the dependent variable was binary, while explanatory variables which were 
used to test research hypothesis were discrete as well as continuous, so the logistic 
regression model was a justifi ed choice. 
4 With a categorical dependent variable, discriminant function analysis is usually employed 
if all of the predictors are continuous and nicely distributed; logit analysis is usually employed if 
all of the predictors are categorical; and logistic regression is often chosen if the predictor variables 
are a mix of continuous and categorical variables and/or if they are not nicely distributed (logistic 
regression makes no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables). 
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3.2. Research Hypothesis 
Based on the arguments that arise from the presented literature survey, sev-
eral hypotheses have been proposed in this paper. First we argue that hedging 
can increase the value of the fi rm by reducing the costs associated with fi nancial 
distress, the agency costs of debt, expected taxes and capital market imperfec-
tions. These premises are known as the shareholder maximisation hypothesis and 
are tested in the following assumptions. The argument of reducing the costs of 
fi nancial distress implies that the benefi ts of hedging should be greater the larger 
the fraction of fi xed claims in the fi rm’s capital structure. The agency cost of 
debt argument implies that the benefi ts of hedging should be greater the higher 
the fi rm’s leverage and asymmetric information problem. The argument of costly 
external fi nancing implies that the benefi ts of hedging should be greater the more 
growth options are in the fi rm’s investment opportunity set. The tax hypothesis 
suggests that the benefi ts of hedging should be greater the higher the probability 
that the fi rm’s pre-tax income is in the progressive region of the tax schedule, and 
the greater the value of the fi rm’s tax loss carry-forwards, investment tax credits 
and other provisions of the tax code. Additionally, the informational and transac-
tional scale economies argument implies that larger fi rms will be more likely to 
hedge. Therefore, a positive relation between decision to hedge and a company’s 
size, leverage, asymmetric information problem, investment (growth) opportuni-
ties and expected taxes has been predicted. 
The next group of assumptions regards the managerial utility maximisation 
hypothesis. We argue that, due to the fact that a fi rm’s managers have limited 
ability to diversify their own personal wealth position associated with the stock 
holdings and the capitalisation of their career earnings, they have strong incen-
tives to hedge. We test the hypothesis that managers with greater stock ownership 
would prefer more risk management, while those with greater option holdings 
would prefer less risk management. Additionally, fi rms with younger managers 
and those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job would be more inclined 
to manage risk.
3.3. Research Variables 
A dependent variable has been created in the form of a binary (dichotomous) 
measure and was coded as “1” for those fi rms that hedge corporate risks and “0” 
for those fi rms that do not hedge corporate risks. In the group of companies named 
“hedgers” we included not only companies that use derivatives instruments as an 
instrument of corporate risk management, but also companies that use other types 
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of hedging strategies like operational hedging, natural hedging, international di-
versifi cation of business etc. The majority of the earlier empirical studies on risk 
management such as Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997), Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Cummins, Phil-
lips and Smith (2001) have used a dichotomous variable that equalled one if a 
fi rm has used derivatives and zero if it has not. Because of the decision to include 
all corporate risk management activities, our dichotomous variable should not be 
subject to the inaccurate categorisation of functionally-equivalent fi nancial posi-
tion. This has allowed us to disentangle derivatives activity from risk management 
activity, which is a major advantage of our approach.
To examine the hypothesis regarding the reduction of the fi nancial distress 
cost and the informational and transactional scale economies argument, the size of 
the company and the fi rm’s leverage have been employed. The size of a company 
was measured by using two alternative proxies - the book value of assets (Haush-
alter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Allayannis and 
Ofek, 2001) and the book value of total sales revenues (Allayannis and Weston, 
2001). Leverage was also used as a proxy for the impact of fi xed claims on the 
decision to hedge. Three different measures were constructed for the degree of a 
fi rm’s fi nancial leverage. First, fi nancial leverage was defi ned as the ratio of the 
book value of long-term debt to the book value of assets (Tufano, 1996; Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997), while the other 
measures were the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book value of 
equity (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Mian, 1996) and 
the interest cover ratio defi ned as earnings before interest and taxes to the total 
interest expense (Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 
1993). The coeffi cients on all variables presented were predicted to be positive.
A binary variable was used to indicate whether a fi rm is rated by the rating 
agencies, what was a proxy for asymmetric information problem. The variable 
was coded as “1” for companies that have credit rating and “0” otherwise. Eve-
rything else being equal, fi rms with credit rating have undergone more capital 
market scrutiny and are thus assumed to face fewer informational asymmetries 
than ones with no rated debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995b). Therefore, fi rms with 
a credit rating are predicted to hedge less extensively, while fi rms with greater 
informational asymmetry will benefi t greatly from risk management activity (De-
Marzo and Duffi e, 1991; Haushalter, 2000). The coeffi cient on this variable was 
predicted to be negative.
Investment (growth) opportunities were measured as the ratio of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets (Haushalter, 2000; Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1993; DeMarzo and Duffi e, 1991; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985). Investment opportunities are also measured as the ratio 
of investment expenditures to the value of total sales (DeMarzo and Duffi e, 1991; 
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Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Dolde, 1995). The coeffi cients on these variables were predicted to 
be positive.
To examine the tax hypothesis, we have used several measures of the fi rm’s 
effective tax function - total value of the tax loss carry-forwards and tax-loss car-
ry-backs (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993), total value of the tax loss carry-for-
wards plus tax-loss carry-backs to the total assets (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997; Tufano, 1996), investment tax credits used to offset 
income tax payable (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993) and fi nally a dummy vari-
able that is equal to 1 if a fi rm has tax loss carry-forwards, tax-loss carry-backs or 
investment tax credits, and 0 otherwise (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). The coef-
fi cients on all variables were predicted to be positive.
The level of a man ager’s fi rm-specifi c wealth is represented in two ways - by 
the book value of the fi rm’s equity owned by offi cers and directors (Tufano, 1996; 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997) and by the fraction of the fi rm’s outstanding 
shares held by offi cers and directors (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Haushalter, 2000). 
The incentives for managers to hedge should be increasing in both these variables 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985), therefore the coeffi cients were predicted to be positive. 
The extent to which options are used in managers’ compensation is gauged using 
a binary variable that equals one if managers of a fi rm own stock options and zero 
otherwise. We have predicted this proxy to be negatively related with the extent of 
hedging. We have employed two additional measures that proxy for risk aversion 
of the manager - manager age and tenure or human capital vested in the fi rm (Tu-
fano, 1996). We have predicted that younger managers and those whose managers 
have shorter tenures on the job would be more inclined to manage risk.
3.4. Research Results
In this section we present the results of univariate and multivariate analysis. 
According to a mean comparison test conducted for the sub-sample of hedgers/
nonhedgers (see: tables 1 and 2), our univariate analysis has discovered that hedg-
ers are not statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to the cost of fi nan-
cial distress, agency cost of debt, investment (growth) opportunities, tax prefer-
ence items or managerial utility. Correlation analysis has also shown no relation 
between tested variables. In other words, on the basis of the univariate results, we 
should reject all research assumptions regarding the shareholder maximisation 
hypothesis and the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. 
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In the employed logistic regression we have tested the hypothesis that the 
decision to hedge or not is a function of the following factors - fi nancial distress 
costs, size, agency cost of debt, costly external fi nancing, tax incentives to hedge 
and managerial utility. The variables tested in our multivariate regression model 
are based on the determinants we have presented in the literature review as the key 
rationales of corporate hedging decisions. The relationship between the decision 
to hedge and its potential determinants can be expressed in the format of a general 
function as follows:
Hedge = f (S, FC, AC, CEF, T, MU)    (1)
where:
• Hedge - binary variable which takes on a value of “1” if the fi rm hedges 
and “0” if the fi rm does not hedge with these instruments
• S – size of the company 
• FC - the fi rm's probability of fi nancial distress or bankruptcy
• AC – the agency costs of debt facing the fi rm
• CEF - costly external fi nancing and investment (growth) opportunities
•  T - the convexity of the fi rm's tax function 
• MU – managerial utility  
Table 3 reports multivariate analysis results relating the probability of hedg-
ing to the determinants of hedging. The predetermined independent variables in-
clude total sales revenues as a proxy for size, long-term debt to assets ratio as a 
proxy for fi nancial distress costs, debt rating as a proxy for agency cost of debt, 
investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for costly external fi nancing, total 
value of tax loss carry-forwards and carry-backs as a proxy for tax incentives and 
share of the company value owned by management as a proxy for managerial util-
ity. The underlined variables represent those independent variables which appear 
to be the most consistent in reporting statistically signifi cant t-values, and which 
appear to be most consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic 
model. Apart from the model discussed here, as we have created multiple prox-
ies available to measure some fi rm characteristics, we have estimated separate 
logistic regressions using all possible combinations of variables representing each 
predicted construct. 
Inclusion of all relevant variables in the regression model is very important 
due to the fact that, if relevant variables are omitted, the common variance they 
share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables, or 
the error term may be infl ated. Additionally, we excluded from our analysis the 
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variables that that have not contributed to the strengths of the logistic model in 
predicting the decision to hedge (measured by the –2 Log Likelihood statistics 
and Goodness of fi t tests). Exclusion of all irrelevant variables is very important 
because their presence in the model can cause the common variance they share 
with included variables to be wrongly attributed to the irrelevant variables. The 
greater the correlation of the irrelevant variable(s) with other independents, the 
greater the standard errors of the regression coeffi cients for these independents 
(see: www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm). 
The model can be expressed as: 
Hedge = f (Total sales revenues, Long-term debt to assets, Debt rating, In-
vestment expenditures to assets, Total value of tax loss carry-forwards and carry 
backs, Share of the company value owned by management)
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Table 3. 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS CROATIAN HEDGERS/NONHEDGERS
      Number of selected cases:                 49
      Number rejected because of missing data:  1
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 48
Dependent Variable Encoding:
Original       Internal
Value          Value
       0       0
       1       1
Dependent Variable..   HEDGERS    Hedgers/Nonhedgers
Beginning Block Number  1.  Method: Enter
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. SIZE2 Total sales revenues
 FINCOST4 Long-term debt-to-assets ratio
 AGCOST1 Debt rating
 CMI2 Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio
 TAX1 Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs
 MNGUTIL2 Share of the company owned by management
Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because
Log Likelihood decreased by less than ,01 percent.
 -2 Log Likelihood 28,177
 Goodness of Fit 29,926
 Cox & Snell - R^2 ,441
 Nagelkerke - R^2 ,640
 Chi-Square df Signifi cance
 Model 27,895 6 ,0001
 Block 27,895 6 ,0001
 Step 27,895 6 ,0001
----------------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test-------------------
 Chi-Square df Signifi cance
Goodness-of-fi t test 5,5172 8 ,7011
----------------------------- Variables in the Equation -------------------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
SIZE2 1,56E-05 1,140E-05 1,8704 1 ,1714 ,0000
FINCOST4 -,5861 2,8927 ,0411 1 ,8394 ,0000
AGCOST1 8,2391 4,3615 3,5685 1 ,0589 ,1673
CMI2 40,1737 19,9344 4,0614 1 ,0439 ,1917
TAX1 -1,3E-06 6,376E-06 ,0418 1 ,8380 ,0000
MNGUTIL2 -8,1630 4,0624 4,0376 1 ,0445 -,1906
Constant -1,5248 1,3305 1,3133 1 ,2518
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced.
Source: Croatian survey data
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From the regression model presented in table 3, it can be seen that the corpo-
rate decision to hedge is related to company’s investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio and share of the company owned by management. Other variables that tested 
the research hypothesis are not statistically signifi cant in the model; therefore 
they do not infl uence the decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks in the 
analysed Croatian companies. Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio is a proxy 
for capital market imperfections and costly external fi nancing. This variable tests 
the prediction that hedgers are more likely to have larger investment (growth) 
opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) for theoretical argu-
ments, or Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) for empirical evi-
dence). Bessembinder (1991) has also shown that hedging activities are predicted 
to be greater in fi rms where growth opportunities constitute a larger proportion of 
fi rm value, because reductions in agency costs are most valuable for these fi rms. 
Therefore, we argue that the fi rm’s decision to hedge is predicted to be positively 
correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. The results of our 
logistic model support our prediction and show a statistically signifi cant positive 
relation between the decision to hedge and investment expenditures-to-assets ra-
tio. When we conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing other 
variable that was used as a proxy for costly external fi nancing hypothesis, it was 
not statistically signifi cant in the model. These fi ndings suggest that the associa-
tion between hedging and the investment (growth) opportunities is not robust. 
The second variable that is statistically signifi cant in our model is the frac-
tion of the fi rm’s outstanding shares held by the company’s management. We have 
argued that, due to the fact that fi rm’s managers have limited ability to diversify 
their own personal wealth position associated with stock holdings and their earn-
ings’ capitalisation, they have strong incentives to hedge. The managerial util-
ity maximisation hypothesis predicts that managers with greater stock ownership 
would prefer more risk management, while those with greater option holdings 
would prefer less risk management. This rationale was fi rstly proposed by Stulz 
(1984) and has been further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). The results of 
some empirical studies have confi rmed this hypothesis (e.g., see Tufano, 1996; 
Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate hedging is affected by 
managerial shareholdings. Our results show a negative relation between the deci-
sion to hedge and the share of the company owned by management, which leads to 
the conclusion that fi rms that have a greater fraction of outstanding shares held by 
the company’s management have less incentives to hedge. This is contrary to our 
prediction and to the fi ndings of Tufano (1996), who has found that fi rms whose 
managers have more wealth invested in the fi rm’s stocks manage more corporate 
risk. Other variables that were employed as proxies for the managerial utility hy-
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pothesis (value of company share owned by management, managers’ ownership 
of stock options, manager’s age and tenure) were not statistically signifi cant in 
the model. Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding managerial utility 
maximisation.
2. Discussion and Conclusion
On the basis of the research results it could be concluded that the explored 
hedging rationales have little predictive power in explaining corporate risk man-
agement decisions in Croatian companies. The evidence based on multivariate 
empirical relations between the decision to hedge in Croatian non-fi nancial com-
panies and fi nancial distress costs, size, agency cost of debt, costly external fi -
nancing, taxes and managerial utility fails to provide any support for any of the 
tested hypotheses but one - costly external fi nancing measured by investment ex-
penditures-to-assets ratio. Our multivariate analysis has shown that hedgers have 
a statistically higher value of this ratio, suggesting that there is a positive relation 
between the value of a company’s investment and the decision to hedge. This re-
sult is consistent with our prediction that the benefi ts of hedging should be greater 
the more growth options there are in the fi rm’s investment opportunity set and to 
the fi ndings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001). Regarding this result, we need to emphasise that the association between 
hedging and costly external fi nancing is not robust to the other variable employed 
as a proxy for testing this hypothesis. Also, the result has not been supported by 
univariate analysis; therefore it should be interpreted with care. 
Moreover, our analysis has revealed statistically signifi cant relation between 
the decision to hedge and managerial utility maximisation hypothesis but this re-
lation is contrary to the predicted sign. Multivariate analysis has revealed that 
the corporate decision to hedge is negatively related to the share of the company 
owned by management, suggesting that Croatian companies where managers 
have more wealth invested in company stocks are less likely to hedge. This re-
sult is inconsistent to the results of previous studies cited in our paper and to our 
own prediction. However, we need to emphasise that the inability to use variables 
employed in other studies (e.g. see: Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000) as proxies for 
the extent to which options are used in managers’ compensation plans5, has pre-
5 Like the total option holdings held by offi cers and directors or the market value of shares 
that could be owned by managers and directors by exercising their options.
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vented us from testing whether managerial option holdings in Croatian companies 
has an impact on the result that managers who own company’s shares do not act 
in a risk averse manner and have less incentive to hedge corporate risks. Manage-
rial option holdings are not available as public information in the case of Croatian 
companies and managers were not willing to reveal this information in the survey 
questionnaire. 
We believe a negative relation between the decision to hedge and share of 
the company owned by management can be explained by the fact that, apart from 
stock holdings, Croatian managers also have option-like provisions. It has been 
proven (Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998) that managers with greater option 
holdings would prefer less risk management. The theoretical explanation for this 
is offered by Smith and Stulz (1985) who claimed that managers’ compensation 
plans can infl uence their hedging choices. They have argued that the expected util-
ity of managerial wealth has the shape of a convex function of the fi rm’s expected 
profi ts when managers own unexercised options. Therefore, the more option-like 
features there are in the compensation plans, the less managers will hedge. In this 
case, managers can choose to increase the risk of the fi rm in order to increase the 
value of their options. Yet, further research among the analysed Croatian com-
panies should be conducted to confi rm this argument as it is based only on our 
opinion, not on empirical evidence. 
Directions for further research stem from our research fi ndings as well as 
from missed opportunities that indicate avenues for future research. The advan-
tage of our work is that it provides an impetus for further research to move beyond 
the existing hedging theories, which have proven inadequate in explaining risk 
management decisions in the large Croatian companies. 
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NAČELA UPRAVLJANJA KORPORACIJSKIM RIZICIMA: 
SLUČAJ HRVATSKIH PODUZEĆA
Sažetak
Prema Modelu vrednovanja kapitalne imovine i Modigliani-Millerovom modelu, 
upravljanje korporacijskim rizicima ne utječe na vrijednost poduzeća. Ipak, menadžeri 
neprestano poduzimaju aktivnosti koje su usmjerene prema redukciji rizika kojima je 
poduzeće izloženo. Nesavršenosti tržišta kapitala navode se kao objašnjenje neusklađenosti 
teorijskih stajališta i empirijskih dokaza, jer one ukazuju na važnost funkcije upravljanja 
rizicima u poduzeću i na njezin utjecaj na vrijednost poduzeća. Ovaj rad analizira uprav-
ljanje korporacijskim rizicima u velikim nefi nancijskim poduzećima u Hrvatskoj. Koristeći 
se univarijantnom i multivarijantnom statističkom analizom, u radu autorica istražuje je li 
odluka o “hedgingu” u analiziranim hrvatskim poduzećima funkcija određenih karakteris-
tika poduzeća, koje su se pokazale značajnima u odlukama o upravljanju korporacijskim 
rizicima.
Ključne riječi: upravljanje korporacijskim rizicima, teorije o “hedgingu”, povećanje 
bogatstva dioničara, povećanje blagostanja menadžera, velika hrvatska poduzeća 
